Differential privacy is a useful tool to build machine learning models which do not release too much information about the training data. We study the Rényi differential privacy of stochastic gradient descent when each training example is sampled without replacement (also known as cyclic SGD). Cyclic SGD is typically faster than traditional SGD and is the algorithm of choice in large-scale implementations. We recover privacy guarantees for cyclic SGD which are competitive with those known for sampling with replacement. Our proof techniques make no assumptions on the model or on the data and are hence widely applicable.
INTRODUCTION
Machine learning with differential privacy [6] (DP) and its relaxations have sparked growing interest in the last few years. Several approaches have been proposed to optimize models with stochastic gradient descent (SGD) using private data, including objective perturbation [4] , output perturbation [5] and gradient perturbation [1] .
e la er is the most widely applicable, since it makes li le assumptions on the model or on the data.
In this paper, we are interested in analyzing the effect of the order in which data is processed on privacy. Consider one epoch of SGD with batch size one. At each step, one can independently pick uniformly at random a new training sample. We call this method sampling with replacement. Another option is to first make a permutation of the whole dataset, and then process all the samples according to this permuted ordering. is second method, known as sampling without replacement or as cyclic SGD, is known to have faster convergence [3, 9] and is hence more widely used in practice. While the privacy of the "sampling with replacement" method is well-known [1] , it is unclear how usual proof techniques extend to the second approach. Recently, the effect of shuffling on ε pure differential privacy has been studied [7] . However, relaxations such as (ε, δ ) differential privacy or Rényi differential privacy are more popular since they are able to obtain smaller privacy budgets.
We perform an analysis of the Rényi differential privacy (RDP) [11] of SGD without replacement, with a particular focus on privacy guarantees that still hold in a non-convex se ing. We prove privacy guarantees for sampling without replacement which are asymptotically similar to those for sampling with replacement, with the restriction that each epoch is stopped part-way through the dataset has been processed. We also provide a toy example showing that the two sampling methods can have different behaviours in terms of privacy.
Rényi differential privacy. Pure differential privacy is a strong but hard to enforce guarantee. It was first relaxed with the weaker (ε, δ ) differential privacy, and then with the intermediate notion of Rényi differential privacy (RDP) [11] . RDP has the triple advantage of (i) being easy to work with Gaussian perturbations, (ii) simple composition properties, and (iii) easy amplification via subsampling [2, 12] , under some assumptions on the required privacy level.
Given a dataset D = (x 1 , ..., x n ) ∈ R r ×n and some algorithm A, suppose D ′ is a dataset that differs from D only in one data point. en, define p and q be the probability distributions of the output of A on D and D ′ respectively. e algorithm A is said to have (α, ε(α)) Rényi differential privacy if:
we run e epochs of cyclic SGD with batch size one. Our algorithm takes as inputs the dataset, an initial parameter θ 0 ∈ R d , a learning rate γ > 0, a loss function ℓ : R d × R r → R and a gradient clipping parameter L > 0. Every epoch, we make a permutation S i of D, then return a sequence of parameters (θ 1 , ..., θ t ) computed a er t clipped gradient steps with loss ℓ, processing the dataset in order. At each gradient step, Gaussian noise is added to the stochastic gradient, so that each gradient step (ignoring gradient clipping for readability) is:
Importantly, our algorithm only processes τ ∈ (0, 1) fraction of the shuffled data before moving on to the next epoch-it does not perform a full cycle. is is crucial to our privacy results.
Algorithm 1 Private SGD with Shuffling
θ ← θ 0 3:
for i = 1 to e/τ do ⊲ e is the expected number of passes over each data point 4: (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ← RandomPermutation({1, . . . , n}) ⊲ Shuffle the data 5: for j = 1 to ⌊τn⌋ do ⊲ Each pass over the dataset is stopped part-way 6: x ← x s j 7:
return θ ⊲ Return the final model or alternatively the whole sequence of {θ t } 2.2 Privacy Guarantees T 2.1 (P ). At any epoch e and step t of Algorithm 1, let θ [1:t ] = {θ 1 , . . . , θ t } be the outputs. Conditioned on θ [1:t ] and assuming σ 2 ≥ 4L 2 , the t + 1-th step satisfies (α, ε t (α))-RDP for
e privacy bound degrades with t, and ultimately at t = n no privacy is obtained. is is the main reason why we only process τ fraction of each epoch. e condition on σ 2 corresponds to the high noise/high privacy regime considered in [1] . We can then use eorem 2.1 to obtain the following global privacy guarantee on our procedure.
T 2.2 (G )
. e output sequence of parameters {θ t } given by Algorithm 1 satisfies (α, ε(α))-Rényi differential privacy for
P . We will mainly rely on (Proposition 1) from [11] which states that a composition of a (α, ε 1 ) and (α, ε 2 ) RDP procedures is (α, ε 1 + ε 2 )-RDP. We thus have that assuming σ 2 ≥ 4L 2 , the privacy of Algorithm 1 is
Our analysis recovers the same asymptotic rate as for sampling with replacement [1] . We can easily translate the bounds into (ε, δ ) differential privacy: Algorithm 1 has privacy (ε(α) + log(1/δ )/(α − 1), δ ) for any 0 < δ < 1 [11] . Tighter (ε, δ ) bounds can be obtained using a privacy accountant as in [1] that keeps track of the privacy loss at each step and uses the optimal α.
PROOF OVERVIEW 3.1 Privacy amplification via non-uniform subsampling
Subsampling the dataset with ratio ρ = 1/n before using an (α, ε)-RDP algorithm roughly increases its privacy to (α, ρ 2 ε) [12] and this is used to compute the RDP of SGD with replacement. Suppose instead that we are subsampling with non uniform weights (w 1 , ..., w n ) [10] . ese weights may potentially depend on the processed data but can be upper bounded almost surely w i ≤ c. en we have the following generalization: 
( ).
Suppose that A is (α, ε(α))-RDP for any integer α when run on data C. en suppose that A is run on a subsampled dataset C ♯ where for any data point x i ∈ C, Pr[x i ∈ C ♯ ] ≤ c. e new procedure is (α, ε ♯ (α))-RDP:
is is a generalization of eorem 9 from [12] and closely follows the same proof. e only difference being in Proposition 21 which states the effect of subsampling on the ternary DP, where we need to replace 1/n by c with an inequality.
Proof of Theorem 2.1
We will assume for simplicity that Algorithm 1 runs only for one epoch with output (θ 1 , ..., θ k ) ∈ R k×d for k = ⌊τn⌋. Let θ [1:t ] := (θ 1 , ..., θ t ) denote all the past iterates (in this epoch) until t. Conditioned on the previous iterates θ [1:t −1] , θ t is a mixture of n Gaussians where each distribution corresponds to using a particular datapoint x. In the case of uniform sampling with replacement, this mixture has uniform weights 1/n, which allows the direct use of subsampling theorems. However in the case of sampling without replacement, the sampling weights could possibly depend on the previous iterates θ [1:t −1] since within an epoch each datapoint is sampled at most once.
Recall that (s 1 , . . . , s n ) are the random variables indicating the shuffled indices. e following holds, for any t ∈ {1, ..., n} and θ [1:t −1] : Fig. 1 . The two possible loss functions, depending on the training example where we used the fact that
. us we can use eorem 3.1 to bound the privacy of θ t . Note that the update step (without considering the subsampling) is (α, ε(α) = 2αL 2 /σ 2 )-RDP [11] (where L is the gradient clipping parameter, such that the sensitivity of one gradient step is less than 2L). eorem 3.1 then tells us that:
Because of the use of Gaussian noise, as noted by [12] , this bound has a different behaviour depending on the size of σ 2 . We consider the case of σ 2 large enough (σ 2 ≥ 4L 2 ), which is the one handled in [1] . en we can simplify the above terms to obtain eorem 2.1.
SAMPLING WITH REPLACEMENT CAN BE MORE PRIVATE
One might wonder why our privacy guarantee is weaker for sampling without replacement than for sampling with replacement, while both would be expected to have similar behaviours. Here we present a toy example where DP depends on the type of sampling. θ is initialized at 0 and each training example corresponds either to the non-convex loss function ℓ 1 or to ℓ 2 (see Fig. 1 ). e algorithm does two SGD steps with step-size 1, then with probability p returns the final θ , otherwise chooses a response uniformly among {−2, 0, 2} (output perturbation). With p = 1/2, sampling with replacement has log(1.75)-DP, while sampling without replacement only has log(4)-DP.
Intuitively, the example is built such that choosing twice the same data point preserves more privacy (one cannot tell between (ℓ 1 , ℓ 1 ) and (ℓ 2 , ℓ 2 )) than choosing different ones ((ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ) and (ℓ 2 , ℓ 1 ) end up in different states).
is is a very simple example of randomized response where pure DP can be computed exactly, but the same principle can be applied to SGD with gradient perturbation, albeit with approximate computations.
CONCLUSION
We proposed a simple analysis of the privacy of SGD with gradient perturbation when sampling is done without replacement. We make no assumptions on the convexity or smoothness of the problem. Our analysis extends results from [8] to non convex se ings, when it is possible to shuffle the training data. e privacy guarantees are almost the same as for sampling with replacement [1] , up to a slight modification of the shuffling procedure. is might be advantageous in practice since cyclic SGD is more commonly used and empirically converges significantly faster. A caveat though is that it is unclear if cyclic SGD with the noise added still retains its speed of convergence. Further, our guarantees hold even when the whole sequence of iterates is released, allowing its use in distributed and decentralized se ings where multiple workers want to hide the data from each other.
